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Research Question��

In Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M Stinnett’s article “Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict,” the authors explore the correlation between climate change and militarized conflict in relation to transboundary rivers as a causal mechanism. Rivers serve an important role for many countries and can be the most prominent resource depending on the geological location. Farmers use rivers for irrigation properties to water and sanitize crops, and different governmental agencies may even purify river water for drinking water. However, due to climate change, precipitation patterns have begun to drastically change; for many countries, this has been in the form of prolonged periods of drought and dry spells, especially during the summertime when water is most crucial. Tir and Stinnett hypothesize that with increased drought affecting these transboundary rivers, conflicts are bound to occur between different nations due to increased competition and resource scarcities. This is significant to research because with increased climate change and longer periods of drought in certain regions, militarized conflict may increase due to tensions over transboundary rivers.

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Despite this, the authors argue that with a strong institutional presence in these areas, militarized conflict will not develop into something greater, such as a full-scale war. They claim that while climate change has been shown to increase conflict, due to conflict resolution and treaty enforcement (especially in the forms of river treaties), conflict has been reduced or subsidized before it can come to fruition. Tir and Stinnett theorize that this can occur through several different aspects that are associated with institutionalized presence (Tir & Stinnett, 2012, p.3). The first indication is that institutions present can act as an intervening factor between climate change and conflict. If climate change continues and the effects become more prominent, especially in relation to resource scarcity, the authors argue that strong international institutional presence may be able to elevate conflict, despite possible empirical evidence, revealing null findings. The second indication is increased policy response. While the effects of climate change are unpredictable, the aftermath of climate change can be devastating for communities. If studies prove that strong institutional presence, especially in the form of water scarcity, is present within a region, this may lead to more environmental policy change worldwide to alleviate militarized conflict. Because of this, they claim that institutions are extremely influential in mediating conflict and creating long-term solutions through policies and treaties.

Tir and Stinnett observe the connections between climate change, shared rivers, and international conflict. In their opinion, water is an important asset to many countries and can dictate their way of life: from agriculture, economic growth, and human migration. With an increase in global temperatures due to climate change, water scarcity may affect numerous socioeconomic factors. Climate change is already predicted to create prolonged dry spells during the summer when water is most crucial, and if countries share transboundary rivers, lakes, or reservoirs, conflict may arise due to competition for resources (Tir & Stinnett, 2012, p.5). The authors are also concerned with the possibility that the value of water will increase politically and economically; therefore, heightening tensions further, as water is a necessity to thrive, which may increase conflict and tension in an economic aspect as well. In sum, their theory is that some aspects of climate change are unavoidable and creates water scarcity. However, with strong, institutionalized water treaties implemented, militarized conflict can be mitigated due to oversight, regulation, and mediation.

Evidence

The research design encompassed in the article involves examination of 315 river treaties confirmed by the International Freshwater Treaties Database. They also solely examine dyads (two entities) because there are typically two actors or countries that share transboundary rivers, and militarized conflict is depicted between two actors. In addition, they chose a large-scale analysis in order to not only account for various regions, but to control for other factors that may influence the study (economy, political regime, etc.), as well as to not obtain data solely from higher profile cases. There are two main independent variables examined in this study - the river treaty institutionalization index and water availability. The river treaty institutionalization index is defined as a scale that has a set of features that define an institution, including monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and international organization. Based on this information, a scale was used to determine the level of institutionalization a river treaty had. The number 0 represented no institutional features, 1 containing institutional features, etc., and 4 demonstrating that the river treaty encapsulated all four features listed above. Tir and Stinnet note that the first three components are variables recorded in the International Freshwater Treaties Database, and international organizations were accounted for in the comments, yet were still included in the number ranking. Additionally, water availability in a given dyad was accounted for by collecting data pertaining to renewable water per capita data through the FAO Aquastat database (Engelman, 2000).

For the dependent variable, Tir and Minette focused on militarized conflict. For data collection, they examined militarized conflict that occurred from riparians, defined as living or located on the bank of a natural watercourse (such as a river) or sometimes of a lake or a tidewater. Which, in this study, refers to a dyad. To identify militarized conflict, the researchers chose the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) scale; each dyad-year analyzed is given a score of 1 if it experiences a MID and a zero if it does not.

A wide range of control factors were also accounted for in the study in order to achieve the most accurate results. A variety of factors, as explained by Tir and Stinnett, can result in or exacerbate river conflict between two dyads: upstream/downstream relationships between dyads (with or without treaties), the number of treaties in effect, trade interdependence, joint democracy, and economic development. These factors have been shown to have an impact on the power dynamics between two dyads, especially their involvement in signing/forming treaties. For example, if a country has the geologic advantage of being upstream, it can impose sanctions on the other country during times of prolonged drought and increased tension, such as economic and political sanctions. Additionally, Tir and Stinnett also examine variables relating to the realist theory. The different factors they account for in relation to the realist theory are relative power distribution, whether or not dyads were allies, and distance/proximity. For relative power distribution, the authors used the Correlates of War Material Capabilities composite index to compare the strength of one country to another in accordance with their capabilities. The variables of allies and distance/proximity were also included, because if the dyads/countries were allies, it was assumed they would be less likely to engage in conflict, and distance/proximity has a large impact on whether or not a country engages in conflict. These were accounted for in the method of analysis and were measured through a binary time-series cross-section.

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The first model of research was solely done by examining the control variables. While the variables applied from the realist theory (relative power distribution, allies, distance/proximity) were shown to be consistent with other research findings (countries who have disturbed power, are allies, and are further away from proximity to each other are less likely to go to war/create conflict), joint democracy was shown to have more significance from prior knowledge. This was due to trade interdependence having a significant relationship with joint democracy; when trade interdependence was removed from the first model, joint democracy became significant, proving that democratic nations, regardless of trade, are less likely to engage in conflict/war.

In Model 2, Tir and Stinnett add the independent variables of river treaty institutionalizations and water availability. Based on their data using the river treaty institutionalization index, the International Freshwater Treaties Database, and the numeric scale they formed, they found that the water availability coefficient was statistically significant. This means that the more freshwater there is in a region, the less likely conflict is to occur; on the contrary, this proves that water scarcity can promote militarized conflict due to competition for resources. The chance of militarized conflict also increases when two countries share the same water source. Due to the prominence of climate change, causing long periods of drought and dry spells, resulting in less water availability, this proves that climate change can inadvertently cause conflict. Additionally, the other independent variable of river treaty institutionalization shows that the more institutionalized a river treaty is, the less likely militarized conflict will occur between two countries (Tir & Stinnett, 2012, p.9). With highly institutionalized river treaties, Tir and Stinnett note that more provisions for monitoring, enforcement, and delegation of authority are more likely to be present, which can mitigate future militarized conflict.

Tir and Stinnett’s conclusion, given the data, is that while climate change is unpredictable and there are some circumstances the population cannot control for, water scarcity is/has the ability to become an extremely prominent issue between countries that share transboundary rivers. Despite this, if strong institutionalized river treaties are implemented in the region, militarized conflict is less likely to occur. The authors also add that personal direction bias may occur in the future. However, it is important to note that institutionalized treaties may be formed in areas already experiencing militarized conflict and are unstable due to other factors outside of water scarcity, and therefore, treaties may appear to be less sufficient in combating conflict than they actually are. In order to promote institutionalized treaties and governance in these vulnerable areas, Tir and Stinnett conclude that institutions should opt into a non-regret strategy; even if the future effects of climate change are not as significant as approximated, withstanding river treaties can be designed to have less drawbacks.

Despite the extensive research and models depicting the data collected, various critiques and questions arise. Firstly, on page 8, Tir and Stinnett note that there are limitations using the MID data; The data from the index does not specify whether or not the militarized conflict was due to water or river relations. While it was under the assumption that water scarcity can impact various socioeconomic factors that may drive a force to engage in militarized conflict, their research is skewed if the MID data collected was generalized conflict rather than water-driven. Another question that arises from the research is how treaties will be enacted, especially in dyads with the upstream/downstream condition. In the paper, it mentions how countries or governments located upstream in a transboundary river may be able to allocate resources better, and can reduce flow to the region located downstream in the form of dams, canals, etc. We have seen this erupt in current events with the Nile River; Ethiopia built a dam (located upstream of the Nile) that has cut off supply to both Sudan and Egypt. Because these regions are dry and arid, which has been exacerbated by climate change, these regions rely heavily on the Nile River, and conflict has begun to arise due to this. While Tir and Stinnett emphasize the importance of institutionalized river treaties, they do not take into account how this may be enacted. For example, would Ethiopia have more superiority in the treaty because it is located at the “base” of the river? Or would Sudan, due to their reliance on agriculture? And, therefore, water is considered a crucial asset in their way of life.

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References

Tir, J., & Stinnett, D. M. (2012). Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict? Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 211-225.
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